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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at the views of intellectuals regarding Jimmy Carter’s human rights foreign 
policy because Carter was the first president who overtly made human rights a part of his 
policies. He wanted the United States to be a champion of rights around the world. There has not 
been an extensive study as to what intellectuals during his presidency thought of his policies. To 
narrow the topic further, this essay focuses on the thoughts about U.S. policies toward 
Nicaragua. Research included looking at two American newspapers, numerous magazines and 
the opposition newspaper La Prensa in Nicaragua, digitally, as well as in print and on 
microfilm. Through this research, I found that intellectuals in the United States thought Carter’s 
policies were uneven in their application, by favoring allies and communist countries and 
condemning actions in Third World countries. Writers for La Prensa thought that human rights 
could and should be promoted by the United States; but by 1979, the writers for La Prensa had 
seen little beneficial change on the ground in Nicaragua. A consensus of writers in the United 
States and in Nicaragua was that if human rights were to be pursued as foreign policy, then it 
needed a concrete definition and severe consequences for those governments that violated the 
rights of their people. 
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Timeline 
 
20 January 1977 Jimmy Carter sworn into office 
23 September 1977 State of siege lifted in Nicaragua along with censorship and curfew 
5 October 1977 U.S. approves military aid to Nicaragua, denies economic aid 
19 October 1977 Sandinistas launch major attack against National Guard 
10 January 1978 Pedro Joaquín Chamorro assassinated 
12 January 1978 Rioting/ strikes across Nicaragua in protest of Chamorro’s death 
28 January 1978 Martial law instated, along with censorship and a curfew 
16 May 1978 Aid released to Nicaragua in policy reversal 
30 June 1978 Carter sends letter to Somoza praising him on improved conditions 
and for allowing Commission of Human Rights to come in to make 
a report 
22 August 1978 Rebels take and hold the National Palace with hostages 
13 September 1978 Martial law declared again along with censorship and a curfew 
because of the intense fighting 
17 November 1978 OAS Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua 
November 1978 U.S. led mediation for a plebiscite, along with Guatemala and 
Dominican Republic 
8 December 1978 Martial law lifted 
January 1979 Pursuit of plebiscite abandoned 
21 May 1979 Mexico pleads with U.S. to sever ties with Somoza, after breaking 
ties themselves 
6 June 1979 Anastasio Somoza declares state of siege for the last time 
12 June 1979 La Prensa building burned to the ground during fighting in 
Managua 
14 June 1979 U.S. asks for OAS involvement in Nicaragua situation 
23 June 1979 OAS meeting to oust Somoza 
7 July 1979 Somoza agrees to leave at U.S. timing 
17 July 1979 Anastasio Somoza Debayle flees Nicaragua
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Map of Nicaragua 
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1 Maps provided by lonelyplanet.com 
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Introduction 
 
 Jimmy Carter was the first American president to center his foreign policy on human 
rights. He sought to change the world and how the United States interacted with the world. He 
saw that all humans deserved certain rights, but that in numerous countries around the world 
governments did not respect those rights. Carter changed U.S. foreign policy to promote the 
respect and recognition of human rights abroad by oppressive regimes, not just for his four years 
in office but even now. He has been the most significant political figure in the last forty years 
who has promoted and fought for human rights, even after he left office. Even now at age eighty-
eight, he works abroad criticizing governments and leaders for how they treat their people. 
 Roughly fourteen years after Carter left the White House, genocide occurred in Rwanda. 
The Hutus rose up against the minority Tutsis with the purpose of completely destroying them. 
In 1994, Paul Simon (D, IL), a senator during President Clinton’s administration, said, “We 
don’t feel there is a base of public support for taking any action in Africa.”2 A press conference 
was never even held to inform the American public about the one-hundred-day genocide in 
Rwanda because Simon said, “I just assumed nobody would show up.”3 The American public 
knew little about the genocide because the government made the decision for the American 
people that they would not care about the Hutus destroying the Tutsi population in Rwanda. 
President Clinton also said that his administration would have supported General Dalliere of the 
UN Peacekeepers but “did not fully appreciate the depth or the speed with which [the Tutsi] were 
                                                 
2 Stephanie Power, A Problem From Hell: America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Harper 
Perennial, 2002), 376. 
 
3 Ibid., 377. 
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being engulfed by this unimaginable terror.”4 In her book A Problem From Hell, Stephanie 
Power argues that if the public had protested and informed the government that they thought 
something should be done, President Clinton would have done something to help the Tutsi.  
During Carter’s administration, he lived up to his call of “Never again!” and did what he 
could to stop human rights violations abroad, and American public intellectuals made it known 
that they supported or did not support his policies. The general consensus was that his policies 
could have been more effective if they had been enforced.  
During Carter’s years in office, human rights foreign policy had many faces in different 
parts of the world. In Latin America, there was a fear of communism spreading due to the 
people’s unrest because of oppressive dictators.5 One such example, on which this paper will 
focus, is Nicaragua. President and General Anastasio Somoza was the third of the Somozas who 
ruled in Nicaragua. He controlled not only the government but also the military and police 
force—the National Guard. The political and civil rights of Nicaraguans were limited and 
abused. The government arrested those who opposed Somoza’s rule, and they were never to be 
seen alive again. In addition to this, the people of Nicaragua lived in dire poverty and could not 
provide enough for their families’ subsistence. 
Knowledge of the events in Nicaragua led Americans to speak up about whether or not 
the U.S. government should have been involved in what was happening under the presidency of 
Somoza. Future U.S. presidents could learn from Carter’s example to act, even if the American 
public did not know about the situation in full and did not voice their concern of the U.S. needing 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 386. 
 
5 For the rest of the paper, Latin America refers to Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and 
South America, unless otherwise stated. 
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to intervene in the conflict. Unfortunately, in the case of Rwanda, the American government did 
not see any benefits to helping the Tutsi. 
 Numerous historians, journalists, intellectuals, and Congressmen have written about 
Carter’s stance on human rights. Were Americans behind Carter’s desire to pursue these 
universal rights for those in other countries? For those who supported Carter’s foreign policy, 
how did they think that it could have been improved to further human rights throughout the 
world. In addition to this, what did Nicaraguan writers think about American involvement and 
efforts to better their lives by pressuring their government to respect them as human with rights? 
 In an invaluable article written in 2004 about Jimmy Carter’s human rights foreign 
policy, which drew on newly released confidential government information, authors David F. 
Schmitz and Vanessa Walker argue, “Carter succeeded in shifting the discourse on American 
foreign policy away from the dominant concerns of the Cold War and containment.”6 Therefore, 
any research on Carter’s foreign policy must be framed in light of human rights and their 
influence on formulating U.S. foreign policy. Their article looks at how Carter broke from Cold 
War foreign policy and how it influenced future presidents’ foreign policy. Other articles and 
books that look at Carter’s human rights foreign policy before this information was released do 
not provide a complete picture of what was going on during his administration and why certain 
policies were instituted. The views of intellectuals during the Carter years need to be assessed in 
light of this new information. Most historians before Schmitz and Walker argued that Carter’s 
policies were inconsistent in their implementation against national governments that were 
violating the rights of their people. Schmitz and Walker claim, through use of the new 
                                                 
6 David F. Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human 
Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28 (January 
2004):114. 
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confidential information available, that one can see that Carter and his advisers were well aware 
of the potential problems with human rights as a foreign policy. There was a deep commitment 
to human rights as much as was feasible in light of other considerations that had to be taken into 
account in making foreign policy. To see how deeply imbedded human rights was in how Carter 
approached foreign policy, they looked at Nicaragua as an example. 
 Another recent scholar Betty Glad wrote a book about Carter and his advisers in drafting 
foreign policy.7 She argues that Carter’s human rights foreign policy seemed inconsistent 
because of the outside influences on Carter in conceiving those foreign policies. Ultimately, 
Carter signed off on the foreign policy that would be implemented, but he and the advisers who 
surrounded him developed it. A couple of these influential men, Glad argues, were Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, his National Security Adviser, and Cyrus Vance, his Secretary of State. Vance and 
Brzezinski were opposites politically and therefore pulled Carter to make decisions that were 
sometimes compromises, and at other times, were more liberal or more conservative. In this way, 
his policies did not seem focused on promoting human rights. 
 In an article on American public opinion, Andrew Z. Katz argues that Carter’s 
administration misused the information they gathered regarding what the American public 
thought about his foreign policy.8 By using Gallup Polls and other polls published in newspapers 
such as the New York Times, Katz interprets the information that Carter could have gathered and 
how it should have been used, and then compares his results to how he saw the Carter 
administration utilizing this information. He finally argues that Carter did not have the support 
                                                 
7 Betty Glad, An Outside in the White House: Jimmy Carter, His Advisors, and the Making of 
American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009). 
 
8 Andrew Z. Katz, “Public Opinion and the Contradictions of Jimmy Carter’s Foreign Policy,”  
Presidential Studies Quarterly 30 (December 2000): 662-687. 
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he could have had for his human rights foreign policy because this information on public opinion 
was not used to his advantage. However, Katz only focused on polls of the American public and 
did not look at any sentiments published by American intellectuals to see why they felt the way 
they did. 
This paper looks at magazines, representing a range of viewpoints, and at the two most 
widely read newspapers in the United States—the New York Times and the Washington Post—to 
see what the sentiments were among published intellectuals and editorials, while also including 
the sentiments of those who wrote for La Prensa, an opposition newspaper in Nicaragua.9 How 
the educated in the United States viewed foreign policy should be taken into consideration 
because the government is supposed to be the extension of the will of the people—at least in 
theory. These individuals also had a different view of foreign policy because they were not 
involved in the formulating of foreign policy and had invaluable insight as to how the 
government’s actions appeared to Americans. This paper looks at how individuals criticized 
Carter’s human rights foreign policy and what they thought it should have been as well as how 
Carter tried to promote human rights in that policy. In order to look at these intellectuals’ 
thoughts during this two-and-a-half year period, this paper is broken up into four chapters.  
The first chapter, “Setting the Stage,” begins with an overview of Jimmy Carter’s human 
rights foreign policy. Next, it includes a look into how Carter defined human rights through the 
use of his speeches. It ends with Carter’s foreign policy aims for Nicaragua due to government 
abuse of human rights, how the president General Anastasio Somoza Debayle came to power in 
Nicaragua, and a brief history of the relations in Nicaragua between the government, the military 
force of the National Guard, and the opposition, both intellectuals and guerrillas. 
                                                 
9 The magazines used in this paper are Commentary, The Nation, National Review, and New 
Republic. 
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Chapters two, three, and four are the heart of the paper. Chapter two focuses only on 
important events of 1977 and articles written during that year that show what American 
intellectuals thought of Carter’s human rights foreign policy, first generally and then specifically 
in Nicaragua, and concludes with articles from La Prensa about Carter’s policy generally and 
towards their country. 
The third chapter continues the story in 1978. First, it covers the views of Carter’s human 
rights policy in general for the year with the bulk of the chapter focusing on policies toward 
Nicaragua, following the year’s events chronologically through both U.S. and Nicaraguan 
sources. 
In chapter four, the story concludes in July of 1979 with a regime change in Nicaragua 
from the Somoza dynasty to the Sandinista junta, an eclectic group of Marxists, professionals, 
and guerrilla fighters, who took control of the government by force while Somoza fled the 
country. This chapter illustrates the final views of American and Nicaraguan intellectuals and 
editorial writers alike as to what Carter’s foreign policy should have been toward Nicaragua’s 
government, and how human rights failed as a policy. 
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Chapter One: Setting the Stage 
 
When Jimmy Carter became the U.S. President on 20 January 1977, foreign policy 
toward Latin America was focused mainly on the Monroe Doctrine and American interests south 
of the border. Carter wanted instead to change the focus of American foreign policy to human 
rights as long as national security, containment of the Soviet Union’s influence, and American 
business interests were not going to be compromised.10 
Jimmy Carter desired to change American foreign policy because he believed all humans 
possessed unalienable rights that should be protected. He explained what he wanted to do during 
his time in office: “We're trying to have enhancement of world peace, focusing on human 
rights.”11 In his view this was a “sound policy” for the United States to promote “the 
enhancement of human rights on a worldwide basis.”12 In Carter’s opinion, people everywhere 
have rights as pronounced in the United Nations’ “Universal Declaration of Rights”; and under 
Carter’s guidance, the United States sought to protect them when their governments did not.13 
                                                 
10 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Security Assistance Programs Letter to the Speaker of the House and 
the President of the Senate Transmitting Proposed Legislation,” The American Presidency 
Project (March 28, 1977) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7243, (accessed May 15, 
2012); David Schmitz and Vanessa Walker, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign Policy of Human 
Rights: The Development of a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” Diplomatic History 28 (January 
2004): 113. 
 
11 Jimmy Carter, Interview, “Interview with the President Question-and-Answer Session with 
Bill Moyers of the Public Broadcasting Service,” The American Presidency Project (November 
13, 1978) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30161, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
12 Jimmy Carter, Interview, “Interview with the President and Mrs. Carter Question-and-Answer 
Session with Barbara Walters of the American Broadcasting Company,” The American 
Presidency Project (December 14, 1978) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30303, 
(accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
13 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Shimoda, Japan Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session at a 
Town Meeting,” The American Presidency Project (June 27, 1979) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32556, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
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Even the people serving him in the Executive Branch, the Cabinet, and the National 
Security Council were chosen partially because of their commitment to advocate for human 
rights. Carter’s National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, wrote in his memoirs, “I felt 
strongly that a major emphasis on human rights as a component of U.S. foreign policy would 
advance America’s global interests by demonstrating to the emerging nations of the Third World 
the reality of our democratic system, in sharp contrast to the political system and practices of our 
adversaries.”14 Carter’s Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, was also a spokesman for human rights 
as a theme for foreign policy. This was evident in the number of speeches he gave throughout 
Carter’s term in which he defended the President’s position that human rights were an important 
aspect of foreign policy, despite his not being involved in designing that policy. Another 
tradition that Carter did not follow was that the Secretary of State should design and implement 
foreign policy. Instead, his National Security Adviser was the extension of his will. Brzezinski 
and Carter had a standing meeting every morning in which Brzezinski briefed the President on 
world events and also gave his advice on how best to respond to arising foreign policy issues. 
Brzezinski played a large role in educating Carter before and while he was in office so 
that he would make the most informed decisions possible. In order to prepare for one of the most 
important roles that a president plays, Jimmy Carter read and learned as much as he could about 
United States foreign policy before he took the oath of office. According to Brzezinski in his 
book Power and Principle, he prepared short papers concerning previous and current U.S. 
foreign policy so that Carter would know what was going on and how the United States had 
acted in past situations. Reading the papers and discussing them with Brzezinski helped to 
                                                 
14 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: The Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 
1977-1981 (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1985), 124. 
Hicks 14 
increase Carter’s understanding of American foreign policy procedures.15 Carter urged a more 
peaceful and less intrusive method of involvement that would allow for state sovereignty and 
democracy abroad instead of military occupation, as his predecessors emphasized.16 Carter 
addressed a joint session of Congress: “We've gained new trust with the developing world 
through our opposition to racism, our commitment to human rights, and our support for majority 
rule in Africa.”17 Because Carter was a president during the Cold War, all of his foreign policy 
reflected the influence of containment and anti-communism. The constant international tensions 
with the Soviet Union colored what he could feasibly do regarding human rights overseas. This 
was more evident in Eastern European than in Latin American relations, as the U.S. has exerted 
more influence in Latin America than in any other region since President James Monroe 
established the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.  
Carter did not see it as necessary to be the hovering parent of these nations; rather, he saw 
the need to promote human rights, by rewarding those who respected them and punishing those 
who did not. In a speech when arriving in Jackson, Mississippi, Carter remarked, “But we say 
that government ought not to subjugate people, that people ought to have a right to speak their 
own voice, that they ought not be imprisoned because they believe in a certain political 
philosophy, and I have been criticized for this stand. But I'll never back down, as long as you 
stick with me.”18 In a speech in Lagos, Nigeria, Carter further expressed his commitment to 
                                                 
15 Brzezinski, 6 and 18. 
 
16 Brzezinski, 48. 
 
17 Carter, “Address Before a Joint Session of Congress,” 25. 
  
18 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Jackson, Mississippi Remarks on Arrival at Allen C. Thompson 
Airport,” The American Presidency Project (July 21, 1977) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7853, (accessed June 2, 2012) 
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human rights: “Our concern for human rights extends throughout this continent and throughout 
the world. Whatever the ideology or the power or the race of a government that abuses the rights 
of its people, we oppose those abuses.”19 Carter and his administration saw the United States in a 
unique position to provide help to the less fortunate around the world, and Carter felt a moral 
obligation to make it a better place whenever possible. Brzezinski wrote, “We all felt that the 
United States had a compassionate mission to perform and that American power should be 
applied not only to serve tangible American interests but, to the extent possible, also to help 
mankind improve its condition.”20 As much as possible, human rights would be the guiding force 
of domestic and foreign policy during Carter’s administration. It would not be just rhetoric but 
action as well. 
As much as Carter wanted to see the leaders of the Soviet Union respect the rights of 
their people more, he knew that pushing the issue could lead to more than a verbal argument. 
With the arms race at a standoff,21 Carter said at a question-and-answer session in Clinton, 
Massachusetts, he was “trying to search with the Soviet Union for a way to reduce the horrible 
arms race” and “we are dealing with the Soviet Union, quietly and diplomatically and, I hope, 
effectively, to search out a way to reduce dependence on weapons without damaging at all our 
                                                 
19 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Lagos, Nigeria Remarks at the National Arts Theatre,” The American 
Presidency Project (April 1, 1978) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30399, (accessed 
May 15, 2012). 
 
20 Brzezinski, 123. 
 
21 The time Leonid Brezhnev served as the General Secretary of the Soviet Union is called the 
“era of stagnation” because he did not change much in domestic affairs, nor were tensions 
between the United States and the USSR as volatile, though the Cold War was still being fought 
in Third World countries over alliances to either the West or the Soviet Bloc. 
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Nation's own security.”22 General Secretary Brezhnev was not one who would back down should 
the United States antagonize him. Because the fear of a nuclear war loomed over Carter if he 
chastised Brezhnev over his human rights violations, Carter had to largely leave the Soviet 
Union and the Eastern bloc alone during his presidency. More lives would be saved if he did not 
pursue the human rights policy towards the Soviet Union than if he did.  
In contrast, Latin American countries were what Brzezinski described as weak, and as 
such, “our influence was greater with weak and isolated countries than with those with whom we 
shared vital security interests.”23 This meant our influence to change the human rights conditions 
in countries such as Brazil or Venezuela was minimal; however, smaller nations that were less 
developed and poor, like Nicaragua, were more easily influenced to change their ways.24  
The one major problem with Carter’s new foreign policy was that he did not have a set 
definition of human rights on which he could act. Carter’s foreign policy response varied 
depending on the specific issues in the country abusing its citizens as well as on U.S. national 
security concerns and U.S. foreign allies’ interests. This made his policy seem arbitrary and 
inconsistent to intellectuals of the time as well as to historians who have written about his 
administration.25 In their article “Jimmy Carter and His Foreign Policy of Human Rights,” 
                                                 
22 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Clinton, Massachusetts Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session 
at the Clinton Town Meeting,” The American Presidency Project (March 16, 1977) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7180, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
23 Brzezinski, 128. 
 
24 Brzezinski qtd. by John Osborne, “White House Watch: Zbiggy Zpeaks,” The New Republic, 
October 22 1977, 8-9.  
 
25 This is the main criticism of his foreign policy both in primary sources and in secondary 
accounts. The historiography in Schmitz and Walker’s article, “Jimmy Carter and the Foreign 
Policy of Human Rights” shows one of the many lists of books written by individuals who saw 
his policies as inconsistent. 
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Schmitz and Walker describe “the three main categories of human rights as: ‘the right to be free 
from governmental violations of the integrity of the person’; the ‘economic and social rights’ of 
the individual to ‘food, shelter, health care, and education’; and ‘the right to enjoy civil and 
political liberties,’ notably freedom of thought, religion, assembly, press, and speech.”26 Carter 
and his administration focused mostly on political, civil and economic rights rather than social 
rights when it came to implementing policies, though in many speeches he referenced the duty of 
the United States to do something about the “basic right of every human being to be free of 
poverty and hunger and disease.”27 Carter’s definition of human rights in speeches depended on 
his audience, because different kinds of rights were more important to different audiences.  
For example, when Carter spoke in Nigeria, his speech about human rights focused on 
“majority rule and individual human rights” and the United States’ “commitment to economic 
growth and to human development,” along with “an Africa that is at peace, free from 
colonialism, free from racism, free from military interference by outside nations, and free from 
the inevitable conflicts that can come when the integrity of national boundaries are not 
respected.”28 Whereas, when he spoke in Shimoda, Japan, he focused on “humane treatment of 
…refugees… from Vietnam and South Asia” in the aftermath of the Korean and Vietnam Wars 
and support for those who could not stand up for themselves because of the repressive regime 
under which they lived.29 
                                                 
26 Schmitz and Walker, 126. 
 
27 Jimmy Carter, Inaugural Speech, “Join Us in a Common Effort Based on Mutual Trust and 
Mutual Respect,” January 20, 1977, American Foreign Policy Basic Documents, Doc. 1, 1. 
 
28 Carter, “Lagos, Nigeria Remarks at the National Arts Theatre.” 
 
29 Carter, “Shimoda, Japan Remarks and Question-and-Answer Session at a Town Meeting.” 
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To further his definition, in a news conference at the end of 1977, Carter addressed the 
crowd: “We have strengthened our foreign policy on human rights, and we are letting it be 
known clearly that the United States stands for the victims of repression. We stand with the 
tortured and the unjustly imprisoned and with those who have been silenced.”30 Through these 
few speeches, one can see the breadth of what human rights could mean and how Carter sought 
to encourage different kinds of human rights abroad and domestically. 
By looking at his speeches throughout 1977 when Carter was attempting to define and 
explain his position on human rights, one has an idea of how he wanted to define “human rights” 
and what was included in those rights. Carter’s loose definition included the “right to live”31; 
protection against wrongful imprisonment or detainment in a country;32 and freedom of speech, 
written and spoken.33 Carter broadened his definition further in a speech in Lagos, Nigeria, 
stating, “I believe, as I know you do as well, that every person also has a right to education, to 
health care, to nutrition, to shelter, to food, and to employment. These are the foundations on 
which men and women can build better lives.”34 It was not feasible for Carter’s foreign policy to 
pursue such broad ranging human rights specifications; rather, this rhetoric showed the depth of 
his commitment to and belief in universal human rights. 
                                                 
30 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “The President’s News Conference,” The American President Project 
(December 15, 1977) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7016, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
31 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Genocide Convention Message to the Senate Recommending 
Ratification,” The American Presidency Project (May 23, 1977) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7572, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
32 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Democratic National Committee Dinner Remarks at the Fundraising 
Dinner in New York City,” The American Presidency Project (June 23, 1977) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7719, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
33 Carter, “Jackson, Mississippi Remarks on Arrival at Allen C. Thompson Airport.” 
 
34 Carter, “Lagos, Nigeria Remarks at the National Arts Theatre.” 
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Jimmy Carter was not the only U.S. government official who was concerned with human 
rights. Before he assumed the presidency, Congress passed the Harkin Amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which “set some of the parameters of the human-rights issue by 
placing significant restrictions on security assistance and economic aid to regimes that had 
exhibited”35 a “consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human 
rights.”36 This Amendment set the precedent for the direction of President Carter’s foreign policy 
with regard to countries violating citizens’ rights. For example, in the case of Uganda, Carter 
issued an Executive Order that “prohibit[ed] a corporation, institution, group or individual from 
importing, directly or indirectly, into the United States or its territories or possessions any article 
grown, produced, or manufactured in Uganda.”37 This Order was in effect from February of 1979 
until the Ugandan regime was found no longer to be violating human rights later in May of the 
same year, when the restrictions were lifted by memorandum.38 As with Uganda, the United 
States dealt with Latin American countries by utilizing embargos, sanctions, and restrictions of 
economic aid or military assistance. Every time Carter urged President Somoza of Nicaragua to 
end the state of oppression of his people, he threatened to reduce monetary aid to Nicaragua. 
This did not always work because Somoza acted as if he could push the envelope. Carter’s 
                                                 
35 Brzezinski, 124. 
 
36 Cong. Rec., 95th Cong., 2nd sess., 1978, pt. 21: 28471, 
HTTP://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/result/pqpresultpage.previewtitle/$2fapp-
gis$2fcongrecord$2fcr-1978-0907/Congressional+Record+Bound?accountid=14503, (accessed 
October 6, 2012). 
 
37 Executive Order No. 12,117, Imports From Uganda, The American Presidency Project 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31746, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
 
38 Jimmy Carter, Memorandum, “Human Rights in Uganda Memorandum on the Normalization 
of U.S.-Ugandan Trade Relations,” The American Presidency Project (May 15, 1979) 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32342, (accessed May 15, 2012). 
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rhetoric of nonintervention and the fact that he had not occupied other nations who were also 
violating the rights of their people showed that Carter would not send American troops to take 
over Nicaragua or initiate an embargo as he had done toward Uganda. On the other hand, 
Somoza knew that his country was on the brink of bankruptcy and needed loans or economic aid 
to keep his government afloat, so he made concessions to keep receiving that aid. 
Because Somoza’s rhetoric and his actions did not always line up,39 Amnesty 
International sent an inspection team into Nicaragua to investigate the situation and published a 
“Human Rights Report” in 1977 that showed the Somoza government and the National Guard 
were severely violating the rights of the people of Nicaragua.40 Political prisoners were being 
tortured, summarily executed or detained for extended periods of time for no real reason except 
that they disagreed with Somoza in some way or were considered communist.41 Somoza prided 
himself on being anti-communist, and would do or say whatever he needed to remain in the good 
graces of the United States.42  
                                                 
39 Somoza charged in a New York Times article that “opposition leaders speak freely and vividly, 
the press prints articles critical of me or my administration, persons are free to travel, to gather 
and speak their minds.” Anastasio Somoza Debayle, “Nicaragua Reviewed,” New York Times, 
March 6, 1978. However, there were instances when La Prensa was attacked after some of their 
pointed criticisms (on April 21, 1978, a bomb was thrown through a window of the building), 
and there was the assassination of Somoza’s harshest critic, Pedro Joaquín Chamorro. 
 
40 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Human Rights Report for Nicaragua 1974-1976 
(London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977). 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Pedro Joaquín Chamorro qtd. by Nick Thimmesch, “Somoza, Under U.S. Pressure, Defend 
Nicaragua Rule,” Chicago Tribune, December 23, 1977.  
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His father had become president of Nicaragua in 1933 with the help of the U.S. Marines, 
who had succeeded in putting down a popular rebellion led by Augusto César Sandino.43 Once 
Anastasio Somoza Garcia, father of Anastasio Somoza Debayle (president of Nicaragua from 
1965-1979), was in power, he established the National Guard to protect his family, solidify his 
control of the nation, and serve as a military and police force against communism and internal 
rebellions.44 Anastasio Somoza Debayle was put in charge of the National Guard when he came 
home to Nicaragua after graduating from West Point in 1942 and returning home in 1946.45 The 
human rights abuses had begun under his father, who was authoritarian and anticommunist as 
well, having been supported by the United States when coming to power. 
 After Jimmy Carter’s inauguration, Somoza sought to clean up his public image by 
openly telling his National Guard to start respecting the rights of the Nicaraguan people.46 This 
included but was not limited to lessening the torture of political prisoners, arbitrary arrests of 
individuals, and stealing from the country folk. In 1977, the amount of damage inflicted on the 
people lessened, and Somoza denounced any reports of the National Guard continuing the 
aforementioned actions. He claimed that they were acting on their own and without his 
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permission when accusations were made.47 Somoza knew of Carter’s ardent human rights 
campaign and saw that if he wanted to keep U.S. aid and arms flowing into his country, his 
government and military would have to make an appearance of complying with U.S. demands.48 
 In addition to the harsh treatment of political prisoners under Somoza, the general public 
lived under a state of siege49 that lasted from 1974 to September of 1977, and that was reinstated 
in September of 1978, following after a month of what the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and La Prensa called a civil war between the Sandinista guerrillas and the National Guard. The 
public also lived with censorship and sometimes suppression of newspapers and radio that 
opposed Somoza’s rule. In addition to censorship, at times curfews were included in the state of 
siege, which were meant to prevent fighting in the city streets at night.50 
 At times during Carter’s presidency, Somoza lifted martial law, censorship, and the 
curfew in order to appease the U.S. so he could get the loans he needed to keep Nicaragua’s 
economy afloat. By 1979, Somoza’s government was in need of a loan, which Somoza requested 
from the IMF in order to “avert bankruptcy.”51 His appeasements did not always work, and 
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specific loans he requested from IMF were denied because of the U.S. vote as a participant in 
IMF.52 Even with international loans, the United States had a vote on approving funds to 
requesting countries. As “an apparent attempt to pressure Somoza,” the U.S. had made known 
that they would not approve a twenty million dollar loan to Nicaragua.53 This was not the first or 
last time the United States would deny a loan in order to coerce Somoza into changing his ways 
or stepping down. 
 In 1977 it was obvious that the Somoza government was in trouble because of the amount 
of debt it had incurred as well as the unrest of the citizens.54 The people were tired of starving 
and living in slums, with minimal education for future generations, a short lifespan (about forty-
six years), and high infant mortality.55 The Sandinistas grew in number and Somoza’s popularity 
declined. This change could be seen in the newspaper La Prensa as the rhetoric became 
increasingly anti-Somoza after censorship was lifted in September 1977. The violence between 
the Sandinista guerrillas and the National Guard also increased slowly until the civil war broke 
out in the fall of 1978 and then again the following summer in June and July, which led to the 
resignation of Somoza. 
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The Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN or Sandinistas for short) began as 
an opposition group to Somoza in 1961.56 “Sandinista” came from Augusto César Sandino who 
fought against U.S.-supported Somoza family rule in the 1920s and 1930s.57 The Sandinistas 
evolved over time and did not have a set ideology, though some of their top leaders thought that 
Marxist socialism offered a good future for Nicaragua, while numerous others wanted Nicaragua 
to be a “pluralistic democracy.”58 Writers for La Prensa openly advocated for democracy and 
liberties. By 1978, the Sandinistas were an eclectic group with Marxists, professionals, 
businessmen, and commoners with conflicting ideologies but with a common purpose—to 
remove Somoza from the presidency. There were three major factions within the larger FSLN 
movement. The Group of Twelve was made up of the professionals, clergymen, and wealthy 
businessmen who were moderate and advocated for democracy in Nicaragua. 59 The 
“Terecerarios” or “Terceristas,”60 which was more cohesive than any of the other groups in their 
belief system, was made up of over five hundred individuals who wanted a Marxist regime.61 
There were also the guerrillas or insurrectionists, who fought in the name of Sandino and wanted 
revenge instead of diplomacy to forcefully remove Somoza and the National Guard from 
Nicaragua. This group acted against the government in small, seemingly random acts of sabotage 
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throughout the 1960s and early 1970s. However, they were not a threat in Somoza’s eyes until 
after the earthquake in December 1972 that leveled most of the capital of Managua, when the 
acts became more frequent and pointedly against the National Guard.62 Around 1977, when all 
three factions and others in opposition realized they all wanted Somoza out of power, their 
ideologies did not matter as much, at least until he was no longer president and in Nicaragua. 
These conflicting ideologies would be difficult to resolve once the Sandinistas seized power in 
July 1979. 
Those who wrote for La Prensa expressed their and other intellectuals’ dissatisfaction 
with how the government failed to rebuild the capital and did not sufficiently provide for the 
people who were hurting because of the devastation caused by the earthquake. The Sandinistas’ 
numbers grew because of the dire situation of most Nicaraguans, who were finally fed up with 
Somoza and the corruption of his government. For example, aid and foreign loans were granted 
for rebuilding Managua from several European and Latin American countries as well as the 
United States. Aid and also loans came from the World Bank and such private banks as the First 
National Bank of Chicago and Bank of America. But the funds for this large project were 
invested in bogus construction companies owned by General Somoza and other rich 
Nicaraguans. After the projects were declared as “failed” after a few years, this money did not 
have to be repaid and so went into Somoza’s and these other corrupt Nicaraguan’s bank 
accounts.63  
Articles in La Prensa, featured titles such as “We Have Voted, Somoza Should Leave,” 
“Somoza is Sin,” “The Nicaraguans Do Not Deserve the Somoza Government,” and “Somoza is 
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an Obstacle to Peace.” Clearly, the writers for La Prensa did not want him as their president any 
longer.64 The number of violent acts in opposition to the government grew significantly; 
however, the National Guard was still able to maintain control of the countryside for the time 
being.65  
                                                 
64 “Somocismo es Pecado,” La Prensa, December 10, 1977. Carlos A. Cajina H., “Los 
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Chapter Two: 1977 
  
 With Carter came a new outlook on foreign policy, which La Prensa dubbed “El Espíritu 
Nuevo” (New Spirit).66 Luis Pasos Argüello explained this new spirit by quoting Carter at a 
Congressional meeting, “We support their efforts to tell the people of the world that the 
American foreign policy will remain dedicated to the cause of freedom.”67 The articles in La 
Prensa in 1977 showed the United States holding the banner and leading the way into a new era, 
with hope for a better future.  
Journalists and intellectuals debated the question of human rights as a foreign policy for 
several months after Jimmy Carter became President. The argument was featured in both 
American and Nicaraguan newspapers, such as the American conservative Washington Post and 
the liberal New York Times, and the Nicaraguan opposition newspaper La Prensa. 68  Other 
countries were criticized for violating their people’s rights, but the columnists of La Prensa were 
silent throughout 1977 (until censorship was lifted in September) on what should be done to 
Somoza and his National Guard. The paper was not shy, however, about reporting the latest 
disappearances, shootings, or other violence perpetrated by the National Guard as well as 
skirmishes between guerrillas and the National Guard.  
                                                 
66 Luís Pasos Argüello, “La Doctrina Carter del Nuevo Espíritu,” La Prensa, January 26, 1977. 
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There were also numerous articles about Carter and his development of foreign policy 
concerning human rights. Articles appearing in La Prensa were the expressions of a people ready 
to rise up against Somoza and hoping for support from the United States, who would remove 
their support from the Nicaraguan government because of the human rights violations that 
Somoza’s men were committing.69 The United States was in a position to do something about the 
Nicaragua dilemma, if only Nicaraguans who lived under the oppressive hand of Somocismo 
could cry out and be heard, so the United States could answer the cry of the oppressed.70 
The silence in La Prensa regarding U.S. actions against Nicaragua’s government was 
twofold. First, La Prensa operated under censorship by the government, where a sanctioned 
government official read every single article before it was allowed to be published.71 This 
remained in effect until September 1977 when Somoza lifted censorship and martial law.72 
Freedom of the press and free speech were short lived, however, because by the same time the 
following year, the state of siege was reinstated due to heavy fighting between the Sandinista 
guerrillas and the National Guard.  
Second, those who opposed the Somocismo saw the United States as part of the reason 
why Somoza was in power, and believed therefore that the U.S. was part of the dictatorial system 
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in Nicaragua.73 Their feelings toward U.S. involvement changed over time from hopeful to bitter. 
They preferred that if Carter were to intervene, it would be to support democracy and the 
freedom of Nicaraguans.74 They accused the United States of supporting Somoza by sending him 
weapons and other military aid. Contrary to this accusation, Carter’s administration did not send 
weapons in support of Somoza’s regime.75 At the end of the war, in July 1979, the United States 
was criticized for not sending enough aid to help the people of Nicaragua who were starving. 
Richard J. Meislin in La Prensa quoted a moderate member of the junta, Sergio Ramirez 
Mercado, in an article, as saying, “There has been no aid from Government to Government… 
There has been aid to the Red Cross. We are getting help from the Red Cross, but we’d prefer it 
ourselves.” 76 As a safety precaution, the U.S. had sent aid to the Nicaraguan Red Cross for food 
to be distributed as necessary because trust for the new government was small and because under 
Somoza, aid that was sent had not always made it to those who needed it. The other criticism was 
that the United States did not send enough aid to Nicaragua, even though the U.S. had sent the 
most aid of all the nations who helped promote economic recovery in the post-Somoza era.77 
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 Blame was deflected onto the United States when it was not possible to blame Somoza 
due to censorship. The State Department was blamed either for doing too little78 or too much.79 
The Sandinistas thought Nicaraguans themselves could handle the situation; or, if mediation was 
really necessary, then a fellow Latin American country should lead it, not the United States.80 
 The longer Carter was in power, the more contradictions American intellectuals saw in 
his foreign policy. They saw his human rights foreign policy as inconsistent, because it was not 
applied equally across all nations violating human rights.81 The State Department did not broach 
the subject in the same way with larger countries that possessed more international political clout 
(such as Venezuela, South Korea, or Russia) or with U.S. allies.82 But smaller countries with 
impoverished economies were chastised for the treatment of their people and economic aid was 
either removed completely or significantly reduced.83 
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1977 
 In the months before Carter became president, journalists and writers were publishing 
articles in both the United States and Nicaragua about his proposed outlook on foreign policy 
and how human rights foreign policy would develop. The first year he was in office was an 
informative year. Intellectuals and journalists were writing philosophical pieces and news pieces 
about his speeches to further spread the word about his definition of human rights as well as 
about which countries would have to change their ways if they wanted to continue receiving 
American economic aid. There was a concern about what this policy would look like with regard 
to the Soviet Union and the communist bloc, and whether or not allies would be able to get away 
with violating human rights. 
 One writer for William F. Buckley, Jr.’s conservative National Review saw some major 
problems with human rights as a foreign policy. James Burnham, an American conservative 
public intellectual, wrote, “Difficulties suggest themselves:  
1) If it really is moral principle that obliges us to impose sanctions on nations that are 
undemocratic and violate human rights, we can’t stop with Chile, South Korea, and India. 
Practically all nations violate human rights. 2) If it’s a question of degree and quantity of 
violations, Chile, South Korea, and India will be way down the list. 3) This moral sort of 
foreign policy isn’t a simple one-way street. When we cut off our trade with them we also 
cut off their trade with us. 4) It is even conceivable that the peoples of some nations don’t 
share our views about rights and democracy and might resent our telling them what is 
good for them.”84 
 
For Burnham, it was not the United States’ responsibility to make sure that these rights were 
respected the world over. He also indicated how detrimental a universal human rights foreign 
policy would be—not only to those nations who would be affected by our trade policies if they 
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were violating the rights of their people, but also to American businesses and therefore the 
American economy.  
Michael Reisman, a writer for the leftist The Nation magazine, saw why leaders in other 
countries would be led to such actions toward their own people: “Persons in power violate 
human rights because they find it effective politics to do so. In cost-benefit terms, it’s cheaper for 
elites to jail and torture opponents and terrorize populations than to take responsibility for failing 
to meet popular substantive and procedural demands.”85 In order for the U.S. to make a 
difference against dictators with this mentality, the United States would have to make it more 
expensive for a government to treat its people poorly than to take responsibility for their actions 
and reform the workings of their governments. Reisman went on to write, “Sometimes the price 
is too high. No matter how fervent our belief in human rights, we can’t protect them all the time. 
Like it or not, national interest sometimes obliges us to deal with and even aid gross violators.”86 
It was important to promote human rights, but it was not completely possible to do so because 
other considerations must be taken into account when a sovereign nation such as the U.S. dealt 
with other sovereign nations. 
 Looking at speeches Carter made during his campaign for the presidency, John Osborne, 
a journalist who wrote the “White House Watch” column for Martin Peretz’s neo-conservative 
New Republic, noticed a trend in Carter’s rhetoric about human rights as being “naturally 
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ambiguous.”87 As mentioned in chapter one, Carter did not define human rights concretely. This 
added to the confusion over exactly how this policy would be implemented. 
 As 1977 progressed, editorial writers and intellectuals realized that Carter’s policy was 
mostly rhetoric without much action to back it up. Looking back, his National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote, “Every new Administration feels it has a mandate for new foreign 
policy. … To be sure, the new men soon discover that the problems they face are more 
intractable and lasting than they had expected. … Proud claims of originality quietly give way to 
statesmanlike appeals for bipartisanship on behalf of the enduring national interest.”88 
Sometimes the status quo is too difficult to change and should stay the same for the sake of 
stability in governmental operations. William F. Buckley, Jr. was a staunch conservative “who 
wove the tapestry of what became the new American conservatism… [and] argued for a 
conservatism based on national interest and a higher morality.”89 In an article in National 
Review, he recognized Carter’s human rights campaign as little more than political rhetoric.  
Buckley continued, “Mr. Carter has with utter dignity done just a little more than talk abstractly 
about human rights.”90 Buckley was definitely among Carter’s harshest critics and wrote 
numerous articles tearing down Carter, his speeches, and his policies—both domestic and 
foreign. 
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Carter’s desire to focus on human rights and nonintervention were overshadowed at times 
by the Cold War. The only countries where Carter would be able to use economic aid as leverage 
for bettering human rights conditions abroad would be small, third world nations without much 
international political sway. This was because they relied on U.S. aid to feed their people, to 
provide their troops with weaponry, and to keep themselves in the world market. Walter 
Laqueur, an American historian and political commentator, wrote in the neo-conservative 
magazine Commentary, that in order for human rights as a foreign policy “to be credible,” it 
“must be consistent.”91 Tad Szulc, a foreign affairs writer based in Washington for the liberal 
New York Times, agreed that the policy must be consistent when he wrote, “President Carter 
must define a consistent human rights philosophy to avoid international diplomatic chaos and 
confrontations.”92 Carter “will have to address himself soon to the non-Communist world, 
including countries that are America’s allies.”93 Szulc argued that “evenhandedness” was key in 
this kind of foreign policy; Szulc agreed with the policy but saw its potential downfall if Carter 
did not fix some gaps between rhetoric and action.94 As human rights in foreign relations needed 
to be evenly applied to allies and communist countries, so also Szulc acknowledged that this 
could be seen as American imperialism with a different face.  
In an editorial in The Nation, a liberal magazine, published the same day as Szulc’s 
article in March of 1977, the author wrote, “there are risks in President Carter’s simple, stubborn 
adherence to the policy… the most obvious one is that it could be turned into an argument for a 
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missionary crusade of the kind that darkens the American past.”95 The human rights crusade was 
one that the United States was on alone; not even democratic NATO countries were willing to 
promote human rights and democracy as broadly as the U.S. was. Ronald Steel, an award-
winning writer for the neo-conservative New Republic as well as a historian and professor, 
suggested, “Human rights is all very well it seems, but our cold war allies, after all, have 
feelings.”96 In order to keep our allies, at times we would have to look the other way—as 
Brzezinski realized in his memoirs, as mentioned above. 
 In the United States, however, “human rights” was a unifying policy, at least for a while. 
Steel wrote, “the hawkish neo-conservatives at Commentary and the dovish leftists at the New 
York Review have found one issue on which they can agree … almost.”97 By June 1977, the 
policy that had gotten bipartisan support was starting to break down and was not enforced as 
Carter had said it would be. Steel went on to explain, “Liberals complain that while the 
administration piously lectures the Russians, and raps the knuckles of the Brazilians and the 
Argentines, it pointedly exempts such blatant offenders as South Korea, Iran and the 
Philippines.”98 He saw this policy as one “to please everybody and offend nobody” so that it 
would “end up not meaning much of anything to anybody.”99 Carter’s human rights foreign 
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policy seemed nice in theory, but it had not been implemented in a meaningful way that was 
going to lead to change in nations where rights were being violated. Steel saw this policy as a 
“gimmick” because Carter would “maintain an ‘undeviating commitment’ to human rights 
everywhere ‘until the last day I’m in office,’” but Steel still did not see how it was going to be a 
real foreign policy because it was not objectively enforced toward our own allies, but only 
against small poor countries and some countries in the communist camp.100 
In an article called “Dealing with Dada” in the New Republic, the author wrote that the 
State Department’s actions were self-interested and did not contain a directly moral element 
other than a call for democracy around the world. This value of democracy was the guiding force 
for American foreign policy the author argued. He understood that “the current discussion of 
President Carter’s foreign policy is confused by the suggestion that some alien substance known 
as ‘morality’ or ‘concern for human rights’ is being grafted onto a coherent entity called ‘foreign 
policy’—an organism more naturally constituted of ‘self-interest,’ ‘national security,’ etc.”101 In 
his view, human rights foreign policy was just another name for what the U.S. had always had as 
a foreign policy toward the whole world—how were the politics of other nations going to affect 
the United States and its business interests? He understood why Carter pursued such a policy—
because “the demand for justice, liberty and respect are among the most powerful animating 
forces of the planet.”102 There was something noble in Carter’s foreign policy that could not be 
dismissed as what the author called “mere idealism.” The United States would be able to 
promote democracy abroad with an extensive and broad reaching foreign policy such as human 
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rights. The writer also critiqued nonintervention and those who advocated that the U.S. should 
not intervene in other nations’ affairs. He thought that this was utterly impossible because 
whether or not the United States was actively involved in a country, it still engaged in 
interventionism because “action and inaction are just different forms of intervention.”103 With 
this conclusion, he resolved that the U.S. would be involved wherever the government saw fit. It 
was just a matter of how the United States would be involved.104 
The United States had been deeply involved in Nicaraguan politics since the early 
twentieth century. For this reason, the U.S. government felt a sense of responsibility not to leave 
the Nicaraguans to fight alone against their government’s human rights violations, which could 
lead to a civil war. The United States had to fight for democracy and human rights to prevent 
Carter’s foreign policy from looking inconsistent to the public as one of anti-communism instead 
of the promotion of human rights.105 
 Although Carter’s human rights foreign policy was seen as inconsistent and was regarded 
as a low priority in foreign policy, advocacy and church groups still called for the U.S. 
government to be involved in Nicaragua by sending aid to promote the wellbeing of 
Nicaraguans.106 Alan Riding, a journalist and writer for the New York Times stationed in 
Nicaragua, wrote, “Many priests and politicians, whose denunciations of indiscriminate torture, 
rape and summary executions by government troops have now been endorsed by Nicaragua’s 
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Roman Catholic bishops, believe that only swift intervention by Washington can halt the 
violations of human rights here.”107 Religious leaders in Nicaragua knew the influence that the 
United States government had in their nation and over Anastasio Somoza. Their hope was that 
the U.S. could and would force him out of office because the U.S. was the only major supporter 
of Nicaragua capable of doing so. In Riding’s article, “Nicaragua Groups Looking to Carter For 
Help on Rights,” he quoted an American Capuchin priest in Nicaragua as saying, “If the United 
States would somehow publicly express its disapproval, things would change here very 
quickly.”108 The Editor-in-Chief of La Prensa was also quoted in the article, saying, “It is now 
time for President Carter to show that his fine words can become a reality.”109 The Latin 
American view of American influence and power in the region, especially in Nicaragua, is 
apparent in such quotes. Carter had only to act by talking with Somoza or sending aid to those 
who needed it. However, in reality it was not that simple. Somoza was not willing to give up his 
presidency until his term ended in 1981. Further, the threat of reduced economic aid did not lead 
to the National Guard acting more civilly nor to Somoza’s government distributing aid in a way 
to help the poor of his country. Censorship and the state of siege were lifted; but most 
Nicaraguans still lived in dire poverty, and individuals were still disappearing because they 
opposed Somoza, their bodies being found by family later—though Somoza denied that he had 
approved such actions by the National Guard.110  
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In an editorial in the conservative Washington Post on 22 June 1977, the writer was 
disgusted that the U.S. had supported the repressive Somoza regime for over forty years. He 
thought “that [because] the Carter administration has breathed [life] into the human-rights cause, 
there’s now a good chance to cut the Nicaraguan military off.”111 He saw the possibility for a 
change to occur in Nicaragua once the United States stopped supporting the Somoza 
government. John M. Goshko, a staff writer for the Washington Post, reported that “[h]uman 
rights advocates... contend that the administration is being taken in by cosmetic changes that do 
not really alter the allegedly repressive policies of the Somoza [regime].”112 Goshko quoted Joe 
Elridge, director of the Washington Office on Latin America. Elridge argued that “Giving aid to 
Nicaragua... would be a very bad mistake,” explaining that if Somoza still received aid without 
really changing the treatment of his people, then other dictators would not see any reason to stop 
their repressive policies either. 113  Elridge argued for a strong human rights foreign policy as the 
only way to diminish violations of rights by dictatorial governments. If Carter wanted to see a 
better world for the masses, his human rights foreign policy had to be more than just theoretical; 
it had to be put into practice. 
At the end of the fiscal year in 1977, the U.S. government approved military aid to 
Nicaragua instead of economic aid that would help the nation’s poor. The reasoning the State 
Department gave for such a decision was that by denying economic aid, they could ensure that 
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Somoza’s government would not use that money for ill; but by approving military aid, they could 
verify Somoza’s compliance with their demands for reducing human rights violations. Also, the 
military aid was in the form of credits to buy weapons, meaning the United States could refuse 
each individual request for arms when the time came if they deemed it necessary.114 What 
seemed to the public like a “garbled rights” message was actually a well-thought out plan. 
Unfortunately it was not seen this way, as evidenced by an article by Karen DeYoung, Pulitzer 
Prize-winning American journalist, and John M. Goshko entitled “U.S. Aid to Nicaragua: 
‘Garbled Rights’ Message,” where they wrote, “Nicaragua… has become a proving ground 
where the Carter administration is undergoing a trial-and-error test of its ability to translate a 
concern for human rights into an effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy.”115 The practicality 
of human rights as a foreign policy was proving difficult to demonstrate. Those outside the 
government, such as “diplomats and human rights activists,” were “bewildered” by the policy as 
it had been put into practice in Nicaragua.116 On its face, complicated foreign policy could be 
confused until there could be clarifying reasons for why the State Department had acted the way 
it had. It was a losing publicity battle for Carter and his administration. 
Both the Left and the Right in the United States saw difficulties with Carter’s human 
rights policy. The Left focused more on how this policy could help the people who were being 
oppressed and the care with which that Carter’s administration had to tread so as not to 
jeopardize a nation’s sovereignty. The Right thought the policy was not feasible and thought that 
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only the complete removal of aid from the violating countries would change situations without 
sending in troops. Those in the middle, both neo-conservatives and moderately liberal, saw the 
need for an evenhanded and well-defined policy if it were to be consistent and meaningful. 
While American intellectuals and journalists were trying to make sense of and figure out 
Carter’s human rights foreign policy, so too were the writers of La Prensa. The newspaper 
included articles from their own writers as well as from several other Latin American countries 
that showed a broad range of sentiments about what Carter said his foreign policy would be and 
what U.S. involvement in the past had meant. This paper will focus only on articles written by 
Nicaraguans along with a few articles reprinted from U.S. newspapers or by American 
intellectuals. At the beginning of Carter’s administration, there were at least two or three articles 
every day in La Prensa about Jimmy Carter, human rights, and Carter’s foreign policy. Much 
was written in the first six months of Carter’s presidency. From there, the newspaper dealt more 
with local news, carried fewer world news stories, and was seemingly less concerned with 
Jimmy Carter’s foreign policy. As tensions rose between the Sandinista guerrillas and the 
National Guard, there was much to report on those events and not as much to report about 
Carter’s human rights policy in action. However, La Prensa did publish numerous articles from 
1977 to 1979 about the U.S. human rights foreign policy in other countries, as well as other 
countries’ views on Carter’s human rights crusade. 
In an article by Anthony Lewis, a prominent, American liberal intellectual, entitled “As 
Far As Human Rights Came,”117 he presented Jimmy Carter with a question: “Will it do any 
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good?”118 What was the purpose of human rights as a foreign policy? Lewis wanted to know if 
“help, in reality, to the thousands of persons whom the totalitarian governments have silenced, 
and jailed, and tortured” was the real goal of Jimmy Carter’s fight for human rights.119 Lewis 
understood that any government, let alone the United States, had more on their plate than making 
sure that the rights of people in Latin America were respected. As he wrote, “One difficulty is 
that governments have many interests to pursue—not only human rights but also natural 
resources and arms control, and so on. … But for governments there is no universal way to apply 
universal principles.”120 He also understood that human rights might be part of U.S. foreign 
policy but would not be the only guiding force for the U.S. in making foreign policy. 
Later in March of 1977, Ary Moleon, a writer for Associated Press’s Latin American 
service, wrote an article published in La Prensa—“Carter Expects ‘Long and Difficult’ Fight for 
Human Rights”—about Carter’s willingness to fight against violations of human rights all 
around the world, even though it would not be an easy fight. 121 Moleon pointed out that Carter’s 
policy was inconsistent because of the way in which the State Department punished offenses. For 
example, in Uruguay violations of rights were met with suspended military aid, but Korea had 
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not been reprimanded for the blatant offenses occurring there.122 Later in his article, Moleon 
wrote, “Carter’s politics has also demonstrated its ability to produce phenomena of 
regression.”123 Carter’s rhetoric and the policies he had implemented by March 1977 did not 
seem to be enough of a deterrent for other Latin American countries to change their ways. If 
Carter wanted human rights to be bettered anywhere, his human rights foreign policy had to have 
more serious consequences for the abusers of rights. 
Around the same time, Domingo J. Ramos, a writer for La Prensa, was writing about 
Jimmy Carter being “the humanitarian President of the century.”124 He wrote that what the 
United States was trying to do was wonderful because they “can eliminate or better the condition 
of those who suffer torture or unjust imprisonment when the United States denies the supply of 
weapons, … and human rights continue to be violated.”125 The United States was capable of 
doing much more to stop these human rights violations than the OAS could, in Ramos’s opinion. 
He thought that the OAS had not done much for American nations. 
Joaquín Absalon Pastora, a journalist for La Prensa, wrote about why Nicaragua relied 
on the United States and the benefits that the U.S. gave Nicaragua and other countries because of 
Carter’s human rights foreign policy. Pastora did not think that the United States being involved 
in their country was interventionist, but that the U.S. was more of a good friend, who was 
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helping out because they had the money to do so.126 This was not free money, but money with 
conditions, which Pastora argued led to the discontent and the protests in Brazil, Argentina and 
Uruguay. He thought, “Human rights are, then, universal. They could never relate them within 
the restrictions of [human interactions]. The condition is not political but HUMAN. Before 
weapons or marines: HUMAN RIGHTS.”127 Above sovereignty of nations and foreign policy, 
the lives and conditions of humans should be more important and relevant than imperialistic 
intervention. Because of this view, he understood why Carter had this “reiterated plausible 
attitude” regarding human rights and how it was so broad in its applications and variable in its 
consequences for different nations.128 
Towards the end of 1977, Nicaraguans regarded Carter’s human rights foreign policy as 
contradicting U.S. internal policies. Adolfo Bonilla’s La Prensa article “The Democracy of 
Nicaragua” shows another view of American foreign policy in Nicaragua. In Bonilla’s opinion, 
U.S. foreign policy was intended to spread democracy, where Nicaragua was the antithesis of 
democracy.129 Bonilla thought that the United States promoting democracy elsewhere in the 
world actually worked against the kind of democracy that was practiced in the United States.130 
As he put it, “internally the United States practices a type of political democracy for the good of 
their own people; but in its foreign policy, it does or contributes to doing everything contrary to 
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their principles, which is for the benefit of their own citizens.”131 Democracy benefited American 
citizens in U.S. domestic policy but in foreign policy it did not help the citizens of the other 
country in the same way. An unfortunate side effect of U.S. involvement in Nicaragua, Bonilla 
thought, was that the dictatorial Somoza family, in addition to American interests in Nicaragua, 
benefited instead of Nicaraguan citizens.132 
The cultural journalist for La Prensa, Raúl Orozco, who mainly wrote about foreign 
policy and who also contributed editorials, had a somewhat philosophical view of American 
foreign policy as it affected Nicaragua. The title of his article “Jimmy Carter: Contradiction and 
Boldness”133 highlights how Carter was seen around the world. Orozco did not think these were 
exactly the words to describe Carter because “it is too early yet to try to define clearly what the 
Carter Administration means as its central line of conduct, to understand—even partially—the 
ups and downs of imperial diplomacy.”134 He thought that Carter’s ten months in office had 
produced an inconsistent and hard-to-follow U.S. foreign policy that had quite a different focus 
than that of previous presidents. Orozco thought Carter and his administration needed more time 
before one could really judge what was going on with any clarity. In his opinion, human rights 
foreign policy would ebb and flow like waves on a beach as situations bettered and as Carter 
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understood how to form policy that could lead to change.135 A concern that Orozco did have was 
that “the enormous responsibility to change this dirty little world we live in [would be] left in the 
hands of President Carter only” with no other nations pursuing reform, leaving the burden on a 
single nation—the United States.136 The new year would bring about new feelings from 
American intellectuals as well as from Nicaraguans, who did not see a change in their situation 
and saw the United States backing away from their responsibility to Nicaragua. 
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Chapter Three: 1978 
 
 With a new year came a new focus on human rights in magazines and newspapers in the 
United States. On the whole, fewer articles about Carter’s foreign policy with regard to human 
rights appeared in magazines, but the issue was still a hot topic. As the situation in Nicaragua 
between the Sandinistas and the National Guard intensified, discontent with American actions 
appeared in both American and Nicaraguan papers. 
In an article in the neo-conservative Commentary, Walter Laqueur cited “a recent Harris 
poll” that showed that fifty-two percent of Americans had “taken a negative view of the new 
administration’s foreign policy.”137 There was a growing concern that this foreign policy was 
“show[ing] more consideration for America’s enemies than for its allies.”138 Laqueur even 
criticized Jimmy Carter’s policies for signaling “a retreat from the high idealism of the early 
days to an aimless and inconsistent pragmatism.”139 With only a year under his belt, according to 
Laqueur, Carter had already abandoned the ideology he had promised he would stand up for until 
the end of his days as president. Carter pursued a foreign policy that considered American allies, 
American business interests, and national security first and therefore seemed pragmatic in its 
execution, rather than one that concerned human rights. This was meant to keep tensions 
between the U.S. and its allies low in order to prevent them from turning their backs on the U.S. 
for harping on their human rights violations. As a writer for the neo-conservative Commentary 
magazine, Laqueur saw Carter’s policies as fitting into the neo-conservative way of thinking, 
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which involved pragmatism driving foreign policy. The difference was that, in his opinion, 
pragmatism should be focused while Carter’s pragmatism had formed aimlessly.  
 An editorial writer for the liberal Nation magazine took this a step further by writing that 
“conducting a consistent human rights policy” was not as easy as Carter had initially hoped.140 
The article’s author commented on “President Carter’s shifting stance on where and how we 
speak and act in such a way as to strengthen liberty around the world,” showing how hard it was 
to implement a foreign policy based on human rights above anything else.141 Though this writer 
seemed to understand one aspect of the problem, he also took into account the confusion of 
others because of the “bureaucratic struggle over whether specific countries should be barred by 
Congress from receiving foreign aid because of ill-treatment of their citizens.”142 Inasmuch as 
human rights was Carter’s focal point as President, the author reminded his audience that 
Congress controlled the treasury, the release of funds to different countries in the form of 
economic or military aid, and also the laws. Congress was not following the whimsical desires of 
their humanitarian President. In addition to this, as mentioned above, to keep our “strategic 
allies,” Carter could not reprimand them constantly and remove aid solely because of their 
human rights record, though he may have wanted to do so. Finally, the writer pointed out that the 
President actually needed to do just that, as he wrote, “[t]he trouble starts with the President and 
his obvious unwillingness to apply steadfastly the existing law covering aid and human rights 
violators.”143  
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In order to be consistent and credible in his human rights policy, Carter needed to follow 
through with the sanctions he was allowed according to Presidential Directive NSC-30, which 
stated in part, “It shall be a major objective of U.S. foreign policy to promote the observance of 
human rights throughout the world. The policy shall be applied globally, but with due 
consideration to the cultural, political and historical characteristics of each nation, and to other 
fundamental U.S. interests with respect to the nation in question.”144 The Presidential Directive 
went on to state the specific conditions under which the U.S. could apply this human rights 
foreign policy abroad. While Walter Laqueur criticized Carter for abandoning his ideology of 
promoting human rights and changing to pragmatism—what made sense for the U.S. government 
to pursue because of national security and business interests—the editorial writer of The Nation 
article, on the other hand, criticized Carter’s human rights policy for attacking American allies 
more than governments who were violating the rights of their people. 
 By the end of 1978, intellectuals like Tad Szulc, who wrote for both New Republic and 
the New York Times, were sad to see what Carter had fought for so bravely “go down the 
drain.”145 Szulc saw “[a]n insidious campaign … afoot in Washington to dilute and, if possible, 
to destroy altogether President Carter’s human rights policies in Latin America” and elsewhere. 
Congress and others were no longer in favor of the policy because it did not serve American 
interests. Szulc, however, thought that there was finally evidence showing up worldwide that the 
U.S. policy was “beginning to show serious results.” He thought, “human rights policy, far from 
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perfect or even consistent, was the only serious international expression of moral concern by the 
Carter administration.”146 
 Applying his argument to specific cases, Szulc recognized and dismissed as “the 
arguments of the detractors of human rights policies … that these policies triggered the current 
rebellions in Nicaragua… possibly aiding leftist causes and jeopardizing United States strategic 
interests… [as] arrant nonsense.”147 Instead, these policies, Szulc argued, “unquestionably… led 
the Nicaraguan dictatorship to rhetorical concessions to democratic ideals, but Washington’s 
verbiage is not responsible for the remaining discontents.”148 The United States had done its part 
in condemning human rights violations and removing support from the Somoza government. At 
the same time, those who were still upset in Nicaragua should only have been upset with their 
government, and not with the foreign government that had also criticized the Somoza regime. 
On 10 January 1978, the editor-in-chief of the opposition newspaper La Prensa Pedro 
Joaquín Chamorro was assassinated in his car while on his way to the office. The state of 
Nicaragua was one of paralysis, as described by a front-page headline the following afternoon.149 
The general feeling of the public was “one of repulsion and sorrow for the death of a man who 
dedicated his whole life to democracy in Nicaragua.”150 His death was a hard hit for the 
opposition regardless of their political leanings. He had been their voice against Somoza and had 
openly defied him, mostly in print in his newspaper but also in the public political arena through 
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speeches in Nicaragua and abroad. Although they were very much enemies, Somoza was 
shocked by Chamorro’s death and denied any connection whatsoever to his assassination.151 
There was a popular call in Nicaragua for an investigation. Though five men were arrested and 
one ultimately admitted to the crime, La Prensa still called for justice because Chamorro’s 
brother, the new editor-in-chief, did not believe these men had committed the crime.152  
Chamorro’s widow Doña Violeta Barrios Chamorro used the incident to criticize the 
Carter administration’s ambivalent position regarding human rights. She sent Jimmy Carter a 
letter seven months after the murder that was also reprinted in La Prensa pleading for the U.S. 
President to stand up for human rights and press for a real investigation of the murder of her 
husband, which was in her opinion a blatant abuse of human rights. She wrote to him, 
“Nicaraguans hope and wish for a more permanent and consistent American foreign policy with 
the ideals of human rights.”153 She encouraged him to continue with his policies in Nicaragua, 
but furthermore, to right a deeply felt wrong. She wrote, “For this reason, I trust that you will 
effectively implement the commitment of your government through your embassy in our 
country, giving a true example of the effectiveness of your human rights policy.”154 Every day 
that justice in his murder had not been served was a reminder for the people of Nicaragua not to 
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give up, but to keep fighting for human rights in their country. Beginning in February 1978, 
these images appeared in every newspaper issued until the National Guard burned down La 
Prensa on 12 June 1979 to symbolize the opposition’s defeat.155  
 
La Prensa, May 5, 1979. 
  
 
Wilfredo Montalván, a writer for La Prensa, was not in favor of Carter’s human rights 
policy and questioned whether it was “no more than a smokescreen thrown to cover up the ugly 
image of Watergate.”156 In other words, he saw it as a superficial policy that served U.S. 
interests. He had seen no difference in his country with regard to the human rights situation.157 
He argued that the release of ten million dollars in aid money “showed a confidence in General 
Somoza’s regime.”158 In Montalván’s view, whatever Carter had said and done previously to 
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show his displeasure with Somoza’s actions was undone with the release of this money. He was 
not the only one writing in La Prensa who thought along these lines. Joaquín Absalon Pastora, 
another writer for La Prensa who over the course of a year had changed his opinion about 
Carter’s policy in Nicaragua, wrote that human rights was just “advertising for Carter being less 
bad than Nixon and his peers”; as evidenced throughout the article Pastora remained 
unconvinced that Carter really was well-meaning in his pursuit of human rights.159  
Though the U.S. had distanced itself from the Somoza government by withdrawing aid 
and overt support for the most part and had told Nicaragua that they would not intervene to 
change politics in their country, Alan Riding wrote that the belief that the U.S. was still backing 
Somoza and would intervene when necessary was still widely held. This “has placed the 
embassy here in a difficult position.”160 He continued, “opponents of the regime still feel the 
United States is playing a key role in preventing repression of protesters, and they have been 
journeying daily to the embassy to report new developments and seek advice.”161 Even though 
the U.S. was trying to let Nicaraguans change things for themselves, the U.S. presence had been 
prevalent for so long that people were still turning to Mauricio Solaún, the United States 
ambassador to Nicaragua, and to other U.S. officials for help. In the past, their daily reports 
could have been used to inform the American Congress and other U.S. officials that something 
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needed to be done in Nicaragua to relieve the situation. However, the United States was trying to 
remove U.S. officials in Nicaragua and no longer to intervene in the conflict between Somoza 
and his people. This meant the power that those in the American embassy had with Congress and 
the U.S. President was limited by how much the embassy was allowed to interfere in Nicaraguan 
politics.  
 In the United States, the conservative Washington Post reported that “[a] congressional 
hearing yesterday singled out Nicaragua as a mirror of the Carter administration’s human rights 
policy and found that its reflections are causing confusion and unhappiness among both liberals 
and conservatives.”162 The policies toward Nicaragua were “too timid” for some, but for others 
they were “bullying a staunch, but defenseless, friend.”163 Some concessions, such as release of 
military aid to train his soldiers but not arm them, kept Somoza friendly to the U.S. Cutting him 
off completely, however, would not have improved the situation in Nicaragua at all, because the 
U.S. would have lost its bargaining power in convincing Somoza to alleviate the oppression of 
his people.164 In his article “Nicaraguan Human Rights Situation Caught in a Crossfire,” John M. 
Goshko quoted Father D’Escoto, a revered member of “Los Doce,” an anti-Somoza group made 
up of politicians, lawyers, and other professionals, as calling for “Washington… [to] recognize 
that the current unrest represents a national repudiation of Somoza and cut off all military and 
economic aid to his government.”165 The human rights situation might not improve, but at least 
the U.S. would not be supporting a dictatorial regime that was opposed by its own people. 
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By spring of 1978, some of the aid that had been indefinitely postponed for fiscal year 
1978 was released to Nicaragua. The writer of an editorial in the liberal New York Times 
expressed his displeasure with this action: “[the] Carter Administration’s decision to resume 
nonmilitary assistance to Nicaragua is regrettable.”166 He saw this action as undermining “the 
credibility of the Carter human rights policy.”167 The position of the State Department was one of 
nonintervention in Nicaragua; but the Presidential Directive, NSC-30, released on 17 February 
1978, stated that the U.S. would “promote the observance of human rights throughout the world” 
by whatever means were necessary.168 The author of this article thought, however, that “the 
resumption of aid cannot but appear, both to [Somoza] and to the opposition, as a United States 
endorsement of his heavy-handed methods.”169 This was definitely not the position that the U.S. 
wanted to be in, but according to a telegram from Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to the Embassy 
in Managua, Nicaragua and Caracas, Venezuela in May 1978, “The grants were approved 
because they focus directly on the poor.”170 The government gave funds because the economic 
aid was to go to those who actually needed the help to improve the lives of the common people 
in Nicaragua. The editorial writer commented that the “administration appears to be rewarding 
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backward steps.”171 Though the aid was meant for the people of Nicaragua and not the 
government, any aid going to Nicaragua was seen as supporting the dictatorial regime of 
Somoza. 
By June 1978, La Prensa writers had had enough of Carter’s rhetoric. They wanted to see 
change. Carter said he was strongly committed to fighting for human rights, but his record, in 
their opinion, had not proven that statement true for Nicaragua.172  Though freedom of speech 
and press were no longer censored, individuals who opposed Somoza were still in danger of 
being arrested and tortured by the National Guard. Also, Gabriel Urcuyo, in an article in La 
Prensa, accused Jimmy Carter “before God and before the honorable conscience of the free men 
of the world” as well as “before [his] own conscience” of making his policies that had an 
“interventionist zeal.” 173  Although Carter was trying for nonintervention in his foreign policy, it 
did not appear that way to Nicaraguans. 
As the discontent in Nicaragua grew, it was becoming evident that solely removing 
support from Somoza and cutting off aid was not going to change the regime in Nicaragua 
without the use of violence—without physically removing Somoza from his position of power. 
The people had tried strikes, which only led to a worse economic problem and more violence. 
Tom Fenton, a CBS reporter and journalist, wrote an article that was published in La Prensa, 
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“Nicaragua: An Intolerable Situation.”174 He wrote, “The major losers seem to be the masses of 
impoverished Nicaraguans, who are caught in the crossfire between the National Guard of 
President Anastasio Somoza and the guerrillas of the Sandinista National Liberation Front.”175 
The nation he argued, “is in the grip of a growing crisis that kills its people, and its economy is 
paralyzed.”176  
The New York Times’s Alan Riding realized that the U.S. seeking to ensure “that the 
‘right kind’ of regime succeeds him would be to practice just the sort of intervention that has 
won America the enmity of Latin America in the past.”177 In Riding’s opinion, “to pursue a 
vigorous human-rights policy in Nicaragua would probably undermine General Somoza even 
more and might usher in a left-wing Government.”178 He recognized that this was not a favorable 
outcome in the eyes of the United States government, who was very much anti-communist and 
against another Latin American country becoming sympathetic to the Soviet Union. The violence 
that would occur without immediate concessions to Somoza was going to be great. There were 
two sides of the coin for Jimmy Carter. Neither side showed a satisfactory answer for what 
should happen in Nicaragua, except that Somoza needed to be removed from the equation. 
Luis E. Aguilar, historian of Latin America at Georgetown University, wrote an article in 
the Washington Post in mid-September about America’s options with regard to the Nicaraguan 
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situation. He suggested a third solution to the choice of Somoza or the Sandinistas so that the 
U.S. would no longer be supporting a dictator but also would not potentially support a new 
communist regime. For, he wrote, “The present situation in Nicaragua demands something more 
than human-rights considerations.”179 The promotion of democracy, not human rights, needed to 
take precedence in U.S. foreign policy, because human rights would be protected if the regime 
were to change. “Now is the time to prepare Nicaragua for a transition to a democratic 
government, avoiding the dilemma of either Somoza or the Sandinistas [by] creat[ing] a third 
alternative before a tense political situation explodes.”180 In this way, the United States 
government would have a say in who was coming to power and could ensure a democratic rule, 
instead of the despotic rule of another “Somoza or a Castro.”181 Aguilar argued, “Washington 
can do little more than sacrifice American ideals for American interests” in order to maintain a 
manageable situation in Nicaragua.182 Aguilar’s argument was that Fidel Castro’s rule could 
have been prevented because the United States could have supported someone else to replace the 
U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista. He extended his argument to Nicaragua to show that the 
U.S. did not have to support one of two options. There were many options; but they did have to 
choose one. 
If the U.S. had wanted to avoid bloodshed in the pursuit of a new leader of Nicaragua, by 
September 1978 it was too late. Fighting on a large scale between the Sandinistas and the 
National Guard had already broken out all over Nicaragua. Nonviolence was no longer an option. 
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Somoza had to be forced out of office because he had announced numerous times that he was 
going to stay until his term was over in 1981.183 New tactics like those argued for by Aguilar 
were necessary because, as the U.S. Ambassador told Somoza in a conversation that was relayed 
via telegram back to Washington, “the basic problem facing his country was his continued 
presence in power.”184 Many Nicaraguans believed that as long as Somoza was in power, it 
would be impossible for an election to take place where one of his supporters would not replace 
him so that it would still be Somocismo but without Somoza. If only Somoza would have 
stepped down, then a true election could have taken place for a new Nicaraguan president. John 
M. Goshko recognized the problem that Carter’s human rights foreign policy had caused in 
Nicaragua: “through the pursuit of its human-rights policy, it had helped to trigger the violence,” 
yet the U.S. “was restrained by the president’s non-intervention pledge from taking any direct 
steps to stop the fighting.”185 The United States had tried mediation, but Somoza admitted in a 
conversation with William J. Jorden, the U.S. Ambassador to Panama, that he thought that the 
Sandinistas “were illegal revolutionaries and that he would not deal with them.”186 
After the three weeks of widespread fighting in September 1978 had come to a halt, there 
were renewed discussions concerning the United States’ role in Nicaragua. An ecumenical 
delegation of American Christian ministers as well as other religious leaders went to Nicaragua 
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to see the situation for themselves and to find out from the people how they felt about Somoza 
and the United States’ involvement. Of those present, “Rev. Alan McCoy, president of the Major 
Superiors of Men representing [seven] Catholic orders; Dwain Epps, of the National Council of 
Churches, representing [thirty-one] Protestant denominations, and Wallace T. Collett, board 
chairman of the American Friends Service Committee” were three important members of this 
“fact-finding team.”187 Both the Washington Post and La Prensa documented their visit. An 
abbreviated version of their report and their demands of the United States Government was 
reprinted in La Prensa, about which Karen De Young noted, “the findings and recommendations 
coincide closely with those previously released by other American groups and also with the 
demands of both Nicaragua’s political opposition and the Sandinista guerrillas.”188 Some of their 
requests as related in La Prensa were that the United States should “respect the right of 
Nicaraguans to self-determination now and in the future and should not intervene politically, 
militarily or economically”; “should not, however, use the principle of self-determination as a 
convenient excuse to deny their responsibility” to Nicaragua; “should take immediate steps to 
remove all support of Somoza”; should withdraw all military support from Nicaragua; should 
continue actions to refuse outside loans and aid from agencies such as IMF; should “strongly 
support mediation and especially a special international mediation for disputes”; and finally, 
should “provide relief funds in the event of such a contingency.” 189 They saw the situation in 
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Nicaragua and knew that their country was responsible for it because it had supported Anastasio 
Somoza’s father against Augusto César Sandino back in the 1930s and had occupied Nicaragua 
before that. These men did not think that they were asking much more than what the U.S. was 
already planning but urged that the government act faster. 
The situation in Nicaragua called for more than just a human rights campaign. The 
United States needed to intervene in a more tangible way by forcing Somoza out through the 
mediation process with Guatemala and the Dominican Republic to allow for a plebiscite and by 
supporting a moderate oppositional leader who could take Somoza’s place as president, as 
argued by Luis E. Aguilar. In so doing, the American government would also be able to stop the 
fighting between Nicaraguans, improve the lives of the Nicaraguan people, and bring a more 
democratic government to power as advocated for by the U.S. ecumenical delegation, who went 
to Nicaragua. To best promote human rights in Nicaragua, the State Department needed to leave 
aside nonintervention and make the mediation through the OAS work to the benefit of the 
Nicaraguan people. 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsabilidad”; “deben tomarlos pasos inmediatos para remover todo soporte de Somoza”; 
“Inmediata salida del grupo norteamericano de asistencia militar de Nicaragua”; “medidas 
laudables a través de su participación en el Fondo Monetario Internacional y otras instituciones 
financieras internacionales para bloquear préstamos y créditos al régimen de Somoza”; 
“Fuertemente respaldamos el principio de mediación y especialmente una mediación 
internacional especial para las disputas”; “provea fondos de ayuda humanitaria en caso de esa 
contingencia.” 
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Chapter Four: 1979 
 
 At the beginning of Carter’s third year in office, David Hawk, a writer for the neo-
conservative New Republic, wrote about “Human Rights at Half-Time.” He argued that Carter’s 
“primary contribution to the promotion of international human rights” was that his polices had 
“made human rights a front-ranking issue in international affairs.” 190 Another contribution, 
Hawk claimed was that “Carter’s human rights policies could lead to permanent changes in the 
international legal and political framework in ways that promote respect for human rights.” In 
the long run, Hawk thought human rights could change the view on international affairs and 
policies so that they would always be a part of how the United States made decisions. According 
to Hawk, even if human rights played a small role in foreign policy, that was better than if it 
played no role at all. Hawk praised Carter for “a good record for avoiding the use of American 
power in ways destructive of human rights.” Hawk understood that this foreign policy was by no 
means perfect, as he wrote, “Despite the inconsistencies, gaps and mistakes, there have been 
many cases where U.S. influence was used positively to promote civil and political rights.”191 
 Hawk urged Carter not to give up on his commitment to human rights. He wrote, 
“Carter’s most impressive human rights achievements have come from initiatives taken in the 
earlier days of his presidency.” Hawk was firm in his belief that Carter could not allow these 
accomplishments to “fade”; Hawk encouraged Carter to “[follow] through and [follow] up on 
those earlier initiatives” to improve human rights situations abroad.192 According to Hawk, 
Carter’s policies had hit a wall on getting oppressive regimes to change their ways. In order to 
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promote human rights in other ways, Hawk wrote about a few areas where Carter could make 
headway. The first one was a reformulation of U.S. “refugee policy,” which involved redesign of 
the treatment and release of political prisoners and the need for “a coherent overall refugee and 
immigration policy.”193 The second piece to work toward was a “ratification of the human rights 
treaties.” Carter had lobbied Congress to ratify them in February 1978, but as of Hawk’s “Half-
Time” report they had not been ratified. Hawk knew these were important, and that Carter should 
lobby more to get both Houses to sign off on these treaties, which would further the 
government’s human rights foreign policy. Jimmy Carter declared before the Senate, “While the 
United States is a leader in the realization and protection of human rights, it is one of the few 
large nations that has not become a party to the three United Nations human rights treaties.”194 
Carter concluded his speech, by saying, “By giving its advice and consent to ratification of these 
treaties, the Senate will confirm our country’s traditional commitment to the promotion and 
protection of human rights at home and abroad.”195 Unfortunately, even by the end of Carter’s 
four years, these treaties had yet to be signed. Finally, Hawk called for “integrat[ion] [of] its 
human rights concerns with its policies toward violating regimes.”196 Carter had made it possible 
with NSC-30 to remove economic aid or military assistance, or to lay sanctions. In Hawk’s 
opinion, he just had to follow through by invoking this Presidential Directive. 
                                                 
193 Ibid., 23. 
 
194 Jimmy Carter, Speech, “Human Rights Treaties Message to the Senate,” The American 
Presidency Project (February 23, 1978) http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30399, 
(accessed May 15, 2012). The treaties Carter referenced were the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 
195 Ibid. 
 
196 Hawk, New Republic, April 7, 1979, 23. 
Hicks 64 
 Because Hawk thought the “public supports Carter’s human rights policies,” it followed 
that the “policy follow-through” was “not too much to ask from a president who talks of human 
rights as Carter does.” 197 If Carter’s commitment to human rights were to mean anything, he 
needed the action to support the rhetoric, a recurring theme in the critique of Carter’s policies. 
Hawk believed Carter’s foreign policy had already made such significant progress that it would 
affect the way U.S. foreign policy was conceptualized during the post-Carter years. Finally, 
Hawk thought that Carter’s “commitment to human rights is worthy of emulation by every 
president from now on” as long as action followed the rhetoric.198  
 By 1979, Nicaraguan writers of La Prensa had mostly turned their opinions of U.S. 
intervention from one of seeking support in removing Somoza to one of keeping the U.S. 
completely hands-off in Nicaraguan politics. They no longer wanted U.S. help because as far as 
they could tell, America had not done much good on the ground in Nicaragua. Somoza was still 
in power, and the National Guard was still antagonizing the common people—beating youths to 
death and torturing captured FSLN guerrilla fighters.199  
The U.S. foreign policy was not seen as something that had improved Nicaraguans’ lives. 
They believed the United States was keeping Somoza in power because he was friendly to the 
U.S., both in trade and in being anti-communist, and because it suited American interests, not 
because the American government was fighting for the Nicaraguan people to enjoy their human 
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rights. The author of an article entitled “SCP Protests the U.S. Intervention Policy” wrote that the 
Social Christian Party of Nicaragua, who were a part of the FLSN, “[called on] the American 
people, their progressive organizations and their leaders who are for Human Rights and for 
democracy, to pressure in order to discontinue the intervention policy that holds Somoza and is 
between a process of no intervention and of effective and sincere solidarity for the Nicaraguan 
people.”200 The Social Christian Party knew that the Carter administration’s policy was not really 
one of non-intervention. According to the Party, the American people needed to remind Carter of 
his commitment to human rights because he had seemingly forgotten how important they were to 
him. 
 J. A. Tijerino Medrano, a writer for La Prensa, saw interventionism as a valid policy for 
international bodies such as the OAS or the UN, but not for individual nations. He saw 
international bodies intervening as “perfectly legal, because they are not interventionists due to 
previous submission to their jurisdiction.” 201 Nicaragua belonged to the OAS and was not 
subservient to it nor indebted to the organization. Another reason Medrano saw the actions of 
these international organizations as legal was because “they try to help us to resolve a crisis in 
which we live.”202 In Medrano’s opinion, these international bodies had the welfare of the people 
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as their primary focus; whereas a soveriegn nation might have imperialistic aims that would lead 
them to intervene in order to maintain an oppressive situation such as in Nicaragua. 
Another reason why writers for La Prensa wanted the U.S. to leave them alone to fight 
for their own freedom was that the support the U.S. “fed the Somoza dynasty for forty-odd years 
[had] deeply sown roots” which would be “difficult to cut out—but not impossible.” 203 In their 
eyes, the U.S. had helped the Somozas oppress the Nicaraguan people, and they would have no 
more of it. The author of this article realized that these roots were not as strong as they used to be 
and that the U.S. and Nicaragua were “at present, apparently divorced” because of the 
“effectiveness and credibility of the defense of human rights that has been so fervently 
promulgated by Carter.”204 The problem he pointed out, however, was that “[his policy] left 
much to be desired in Nicaragua.”205 They saw that the seed of interventionism was “only 
harvested as collective mourning, pain, misery, and hardship,” meaning that U.S. presence in 
Nicaragua had only made matters worse, according to this editorial writer.206 Carter’s human 
rights policy had a long way to go to change the situation in Nicaragua because of the history 
between the two nations. Also, Carter’s new form of foreign policy had not made life for the 
common Nicaraguan much better with Somoza as President and General of the National Guard. 
The author of this article saw the situation in Nicaragua as one that could not, however, be 
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ignored. He hoped that the U.S. would not leave them to die, but that it would instead stand with 
them and provide a force that would fight actively for the opposition, rather than simply 
imposing sanctions against the Nicaraguan government in the hope that the human rights 
situation would improve.207 
When the Group of Twelve, a moderate political force within the larger FSLN, planned to 
visit the United States, they stated that their visit was to “denounce before the American public 
the responsibility of Carter’s administration for the Nicaraguan situation for supporting the 
Somoza government”208 They believed that “the United States insists on imposing on Nicaragua 
a solution that ensures their interests, both economic and political.”209 In their view, the welfare 
of Nicaraguans was not the real reason why Carter was promoting human rights in Nicaragua. 
Their hope was that “the Nicaraguan people's struggle will force the Yankees to take their hands 
off Nicaragua and respect the solution that Nicaraguans choose.”210 The United States had been 
involved in Nicaraguan politics too long, and the Twelve thought that after several decades they 
needed to leave Nicaragua alone. 
The disenchantment of writers of La Prensa with Carter’s foreign policy was quite 
evident by May 1979. In an article for La Prensa, Hugo Astacio Cabrera wrote that “the scandal 
of the responsibility of the United States for having created and supported the Somoza dynasty” 
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needed to be remedied.211 The U.S. had made up for “lost prestige” with the human rights 
campaign, “despite its erratic application and difficulty against powerful countries.” 212 However, 
when the State Department could make a difference in the lives of Nicaraguans by intervening to 
protect human rights, Cabrera called it “incompatible” with “American strength or egotism” and 
declared that the U.S. had backed down from their commitment to “vindicating the human rights 
of the abused in the world.”213 As a result, Cabrera thought “only [Nicaraguans] can do 
something for our cause and should not expect foreign aid, much less from the United States 
after they have mocked the people of Nicaragua.“214 He exhorted his people, “Let us unite and 
fight together, because otherwise Nicaraguans will have a Somoza dynasty for many more years, 
and the third Anastasio [the current president’s son] is already ready and anxious to take the reins 
in his hands and the mosquitoes [National Guard] will continue working.”215 The only hope for 
change was for Nicaraguans to work for it themselves and not rely on the United States, who, in 
his opinion, had created the current problems. 
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Much was written in American newspapers about the Nicaragua situation in June and 
July of 1979 because of the increased levels of violence that had resulted in a second round of 
civil war. Unfortunately, La Prensa’s headquarters were destroyed on 12 June 1979, and there 
are no printed articles to reference their side of the story during this conflict or when the 
Sandinistas took control of the government (at least until 17 August 1979).  
By June, it was evident that Somoza was not going to be in power as president or general 
of the National Guard much longer. The Sandinista guerrillas were fighting the National Guard 
in all the major cities in Nicaragua. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, a foreign affairs, and editorial writer 
for the Washington Post, understood that Carter did not cause this “explosion” of war in 
Nicaragua, but argued that his foreign policy’s “human-rights emphasis perhaps distracted 
policymakers from considering other elements in the mix.”216 Rosenfeld did not think human 
rights was a real foreign policy but realized that Carter’s administration acted as if it had been. 
Rosenfeld considered the administration’s actions, rather, as more of an interventionist foreign 
policy than as one promoting human rights, stating that “[Carter’s] human-rights interest is a 
form of intervention—in this instance an ineffectual form, I might add.”217 He saw the 
administration’s policy of nonintervention in Nicaragua as “over[riding] pragmatic 
considerations.”218 The U.S. government should have intervened in order to remove the cruel 
regime because of their responsibility to Nicaragua for having established the Somozas and their 
oppressive rule in the first place. 
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 The executive editor for the New Republic, Morton Kondracke, saw the benefits of 
“Carter’s human rights crusade” in some parts of the world but also saw how it was “producing a 
moral and political disaster in Nicaragua.”219 He would have agreed with Rosenfeld that the civil 
war in Nicaragua was not “entirely” America’s fault, but took the stance that the U.S. “helped set 
it in motion.”220 The problem Kondracke saw was that “the Carter administration does not seem 
to know how to end [the problem].”221 A valid question for Kondracke was, “What should the 
United States do?” Should the U.S. occupy Nicaragua to settle matters as they had done in the 
1920s, which had placed the Somozas in power in the first place? To this, he answered, “Long 
ago, we should have been overtly—and covertly...—helping moderate democratic oppositionists 
to take power in the event of Somoza’s departure. We should do that now. We should formally 
declare—at a very high level—that we want Somoza out and will work to get him out.”222 After 
much suffering of his people and the destruction of Nicaragua both physically and economically, 
Anastasio Somoza Debayle finally decided to step down before his term was up in 1981. On 7 
July 1979, the Washington Post ran an article by Karen De Young called “Somoza Agrees to 
Quit, Leaves Timing to U.S.” Relief from his oppressive regime was finally in sight for the 
Nicaraguans. Somoza was quoted, “I am like a tied donkey fighting with a tiger.”223 He had 
decisively lost to the Sandinistas and had left a bad taste in the mouths of Nicaraguans. He 
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realized that “Even if I win militarily… I have no future.”224 However, Somoza did not step 
down immediately. He announced on 6 July that he would step down, but as the title of the 
Washington Post article suggested. To conclude, Morton Kondracke alluded to how “human 
rights policy can’t work merely by persuasion, diplomacy and good will. … Surely the United 
States should not inspire others to die for its ideals, and let them die alone.”225 Protection of these 
people was a responsibility that Carter and his administration took on when they claimed to be 
the champions of those who were oppressed and that they would fight for their rights, but it was 
not going to be easy to do so. It was going to require hard work. 
 Because the U.S. government seemed so concerned with communism taking over another 
country in the hemisphere, there were never any serious discussions with the forces in opposition 
to Somoza. There were a few moderate opposition groups that were not affiliated with the 
Sandinistas,226 but the United States was unwilling to support any of them, let alone have a 
discussion of Nicaragua’s future—all of which the U.S. resisted in the name of nonintervention, 
at least according to Rosenfeld and others. 
 Alan Riding reported on 1 July, “political opinion is polarized, and many Nicaraguans 
blame Washington for the destruction of the centrist option.”227 The moderate “Los Doce” group 
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had joined the Sandinista movement in October 1977, giving the movement more legitimacy 
because it was not made up of just guerrilla forces and Marxists. Those at the top of Nicaraguan 
society joined ranks against Somoza. If the U.S. government wanted to see a peaceful transition 
from Somoza to another political party, Riding wrote, “Nicaraguans feel strongly that 
Washington should come to terms with the Sandinists’ junta rather than undermine an opposition 
consensus that took months to build.”228 To carry his point home, Riding quoted a young 
Nicaraguan businessman: “Washington says it wants to end the war as soon as possible… but by 
resisting the junta, it is prolonging the war.”229 Yet again the consensus was that normalcy and 
diplomacy rested on the United States, which must rectify the situation in Nicaragua after 
Somoza stepped down. 
However, Somoza stepped down too late for the United States or any other country 
willing to intervene to put together a plebiscite to elect a new president of Nicaragua. The 
Sandinistas had won militarily and were not going to step down. Unfortunately for the U.S., they 
had not worked with any of the opposition forces before or during the civil war. Now, after 
Somoza, the Sandinistas did not want to work with the U.S. and vice versa. 
Once Somoza stepped down on 17 July 1979, the Sandinista junta was all too eager to 
take their place as Nicaragua’s new government. Other nations recognized them as Nicaragua’s 
legitimate governing body, while the U.S. was not so eager to support this new government, still 
wary of its communist ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union and of its Marxist members. 
Nicaraguans were not looking for American intervention any longer because as stated in an 
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article called “Somoza’s Finale: A Victory for Freedom; A Defeat for the United States” in the 
neo-conservative New Republic: 
the American government had chances to assert itself successfully in Nicaragua. But at 
each of those junctures it has made misjudgments which, taken together, have solidified 
in the minds of Nicaraguans the identification between the U.S. and Somoza, and have 
embittered many elements of the anti-Somoza movement, which is now taking control of 
the country.230  
 
If the United States wanted Nicaraguans to have a better view of their foreign policy, then they 
should have reached out to the opposition as also mentioned above in chapter three so that it 
could “have been able to force Somoza’s resignation” instead of working with the dictator when 
he realized that he could no longer hold on to his presidency. In forcing his resignation, the U.S. 
would then have been able to “turn the running of the country over to conservative, pro-
American forces.” This would have been acceptable to a majority of Nicaraguans while 
preventing the radical aspects of the anti-Somoza opposition from being prevalent in the 
government. However, the U.S. did not listen to the opposition. In 1977, “a coalition of anti-
Somoza forces, led by conservative publisher [of La Prensa] Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, appealed 
to the U.S… for moral support.” Not even Chamorro was heeded in his cry; instead he and his 
group were called “a collection of ineffective idealists by the U.S. government.” Chamorro was a 
conservative in the sense that he called for a procedural form of democracy in Nicaragua, 
without the dictatorial family of the Somozas. Members of “Los Doce” visited Washington, but 
“the State Department ignored their presence and made no effort to reach out to them.” The 
United States government had made it very clear that it was unwilling to work with opposition 
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forces before, nor would they do so once that opposition was in power.231 The American Left, 
Right, and Middle were on the same page: the U.S. government should have reached out to the 
opposition leaders so that moderates would have taken over the Nicaraguan government, instead 
of the radical FSLN members. This was not, however, the course that the U.S. government took. 
 According to the writers mentioned in both chapters three and four, the promotion of 
human rights in American foreign policy failed the people of Nicaragua and many human rights 
activists. If the United States had put aside the nonintervention policy for a support of the 
moderate oppositional groups when civil unrest was apparent in Nicaragua due to fighting across 
the nation, then perhaps the destruction would not have been so severe. At least this was the 
argument put forth by intellectuals, as seen in this paper, regardless of their political affiliation. 
Human rights in general and as a foreign policy could have been legitimate and powerful; 
however, nonintervention was the State Department’s course of action, which undermined how 
influential the promotion of human rights in Nicaragua could have been. 
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Conclusion 
 
In the months after Somoza fled the country, the Sandinistas realized in what a disastrous 
state Somoza had left Nicaragua. Karen DeYoung reported for the Washington Post, “Former 
President Anastasio Somoza left the country with … an enormous debt… $618 million.”232 She 
went on, “his administration liquidat[ed] every asset he and his government could lay hands on, 
and stripped both the national treasury and overseas accounts of cash.”233 The Sandinistas had 
absolutely nothing to work with to run a country and several loans that needed to be paid off. 
DeYoung continued, “Even if [Nicaraguan] fears of more government control are not realized, a 
revolutionary government without hard cash or credit would have difficulty meeting the demands 
of the masses and could turn as a result to repression of popular protest as its only option for 
survival.”234 There were obligations that the new government had to fulfill to their people, but 
they were unable to do so because they had nothing to work with and would have to compromise 
their ideals to appease the masses and the banks needing loan payments. Finally, DeYoung 
wrote, “Much of [its first several months] was spent unraveling the tangled mess left by Somoza 
and determining just what the financial picture was.”235 They were not able to fully carry out the 
roles of a functioning government because they had to build anew. 
 The legacy of the Somoza family ended in September of 1980. After Somoza fled from 
Nicaragua, he hid in Paraguay. He knew that if someone wanted to kill him, there was nothing he 
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could do about it.236 He had bodyguards with him at all times. But when he was assassinated, his 
vehicle was riddled with bullets and his body dismembered by the anonymous assassins’ 
machine guns.237 
By this time, the revolutionaries had created an interim government made up both of 
Sandinistas and of people representing all political viewpoints so that every one had a voice.238 
The interim government confiscated any property that had been owned by Somoza and by 
wealthy supporters who had fled the country with him, worked on how to repay the debt that 
Somoza had left, dealt with class polarization, and improved the human rights situation.239 There 
was a mess that had to be cleaned up before a new government could truly function. Different 
problems arose once Somoza was no longer president, but that would have to be the subject of 
another paper. 
As important as the opinions of the educated outside of the government are, they do not 
usually have all the necessary information for making a decision. There were many factors that 
determined Carter’s foreign policy in Nicaragua, such as stability of the country, fear of 
communism, and a commitment to nonintervention, and human rights, in that order. The problem 
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with nonintervention in the case of Nicaragua was the long history between the United States and 
Nicaragua, where the United States had a sense of responsibility, expressed both by intellectuals 
in the U.S. and Nicaragua as well as Carter’s administration. In the minds of the writers shown in 
this paper, this responsibility should have led the State Department to having open lines of 
communication with the anti-Somoza forces to find a moderate option for taking over the 
Nicaraguan government. Carter and his administration should have considered this critique of 
their actions more closely because it could have changed the course of Nicaragua’s future and 
could have prevented the Contra and Sandinista civil war of the 1980s. 
For this paper, numerous sources were not discussed, mainly for the sake of the length of 
the thesis. For a future paper that would delve further into Carter’s foreign policy and the views 
of American intellectuals, the research could be expanded to include more United States 
newspapers, such as the Miami Herald, which La Prensa reprinted articles from more and 
referenced in other articles more than it did the New York Times or Washington Post. Even the 
Los Angeles Times or Chicago Tribune would be useful for other geographical and political 
perspectives. Also, Novedades—the government run newspaper in Nicaragua—could add 
information about the sentiments of the Nicaraguan people. Other Central American newspapers 
may have published other Nicaraguan intellectuals’ opinions because such writers could perhaps 
have published more easily abroad than in their own country, at least during censorship. This 
might provide a more rounded picture of what was presented in the public realm about 
Nicaragua. Chamorro and other intellectuals wrote books and journal articles expressing 
opinions that could not have been printed in Nicaragua, and that could also add to our knowledge 
about what they thought the U.S. should be doing in their country. Having a research grant to go 
to Nicaragua would be a next step for graduate work. 
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